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Abstract 
A simple derivation of the non-expected utility Nash outcome, as defined in 
Rubinstein et al. (1992) [Rubinstein, A., Safra, Z., Thomson, W., 1992. On the 
interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution and its extension to non-expected utility 
preferences. Econometrica, 60, 1171–1186] is given for the class of decision weight 
utility functions. Conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. 
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1. Introduction 
In Rubinstein et al. (1992), RST hereafter, the Nash solution is redefined in terms of 
non-expected utility (NEU) preferences. This new definition has a very attractive 
interpretation, but it is stated in terms of preferences. This note aims at providing 
results for the NEU Nash solution stated in utility function form that will be useful in 
applications and make it easier to work with NEU preferences. 
The class of NEU preferences considered in this note are rank dependent or decision 
weight (DW) utility function preferences, as defined in e.g., Quiggin (1982) or Tversky 
and Wakker (1995). This class is rich enough to capture most of the observed 
violations of the expected utility axioms. 
Grant and Kajii (1995) characterize the Nash solution for the class of disagreement 
linear (DL) utility functions. The classes of DL and DW utility functions partly overlap. 
So, our results extend the results known for DL utility functions into the class of DW 
utility functions. General NEU functions, including DW utility functions, and n players, 
n≥2, are considered in Grant and Kajii (1994), GK94 hereafter. Their main results are 
obtained by imposing conditions such that the separating hyperplane (SH) theorem 
can be applied. In GK94 the main results are applied to the class of DW utility 
functions. In this note we make the following points. First, the Nash solution is 
formulated in DW utility function form. Second, we derive a simple necessary 
condition which generalizes the Nash solution formula for DW utility functions in 
GK94. Our derivation is very simple. Next, we discuss the consequences of applying 
the SH theorem. As an alternative, we derive a less restrictive sufficient condition in 
terms of first derivatives only. This means that no conditions need to be imposed on 
second derivatives, as is done in GK94. Finally, we provide an example that shows 
that the conditions imposed in GK94 are unduly restrictive. 
2. The bargaining problem 
Consider the bargaining problem over one dollar with NEU preferences, i.e., the set X 
of alternatives is equal to {x   
 
+
2|x1+x2=1}, the NEU preference relation of player i, i=1, 2, over lotteries is i, and 
the disagreement outcome is 0=(0,0). The NEU definition of the Nash solution is 
stated in terms of lotteries with at most two prizes. Denote by p·x the lottery which 
assigns probability p to the partition x X, and the probability 1−p to the 
disagreement outcome. Each player's NEU preference relation i, i=1, 2, is 
represented by a DW utility function. This means that the NEU function for player i, 
i=1, 2, over the lottery p·x has the form wi(p) ui(xi), where ui(0)=0 is normalized and 
the decision weight function wi satisfies wi(0)=0 and wi(1)=1. We assume that ui, i=1, 
2, is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in xi and that wi is strictly 
increasing in p and continuously differentiable. Thus, ui′(xi)>0 and 0<wi′(p)<∞. 
Therefore, the inverse function wi−1(q) of wi(p), i=1, 2, exists, is strictly increasing and 
differentiable. The sufficient conditions imposed in GK94 are ui, i=1, 2, log-concave 
and wi convex and log-concave. At this point we give the NEU definition of the Nash 
solution as proposed in RST. 
Definition 1. The partition x* X is a Nash outcome if for every p [0, 1] and x X: 
 
3. Main results 
The first result reformulates definition 1. Suppose x*=(x1*, 1−x1*) satisfies definition 1. 
Then we define the continuous function 
(1) 
 
The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient condition for x* to be a 
Nash outcome. 
Proposition 1. The partition x* X is a Nash outcome iff f(x1; x1*)≥0 for all x1 [0, 1]. 
Proof.1 Consider x=(x1, 1−x1), x1 (x1*, 1]. Then for all p [0, 1], p·x 21·x* and, 
therefore, for all p [0, 1] the condition [p·x 21·x* p·x* 11·x] holds trivially. Next, it 
holds that 
(2) 
 and 
(3) 
 
The condition [p·x 11·x* p·x* 21·x] requires that 
 
for x1 (x1*, 1]. Similar arguments yield the stated expression in case x1 [0, x1*). □ 
Corollary 2. If w1(p)=w2(p), then x* X is a Nash outcome iff 
 
Note that the corollary is valid for all expected utility functions, because 
w1(p)=w2(p)=p in this case.  
Since f is differentiable (x1≠x1*) and f(x1*; x1*)=0 it is obvious that a necessary 
condition for f(x1; x1*)≥0 is that the left and right derivative in x1=x1* are non-positive 
respectively non-negative. The first derivative of f is given by 
(4) 
 
The following proposition reformulates the necessary condition. It extends the 
formula for DW utility functions in GK94. 
Proposition 3. If x* X is a Nash outcome, then x1* is a solution to the first order 
condition of the function  
 
. 
Proof. Combining the expressions  
 
and  
 
yields 
 
Hence, x1* is a solution to the first order condition of w2′(1) ln(u1(x1))+w1′(1) 
ln(u2(1−x1)). □ 
Note that the arguments in the proof imply that  
 
and, hence, f is also differentiable in x1=x1* and f′(x1*; x1*)=0.  
If we additionally impose ui, i=1, 2, is log-concave, then x1* is the unique interior 
maximizer of  
 
, which is the formula derived in GK94 for DW utility functions under additional 
restrictions on wi, i=1, 2. It is strikingly similar to the standard asymmetric Nash 
solution for expected utility preferences (e.g., Kalai, 1977 or Roth, 1979). The reason 
that the derivatives of w1 and w2 in p=1 uniquely determine the weights is as follows. 
In RST it is argued that the Nash solution should be robust in the sense that every 
objection made by one of the players should be credibly counter objected by the 
other player. In particular, this should hold if the objecting player wants an 
incremental higher share. For such an incremental extra share this player can only 
afford a low risk of breakdown, i.e., p≈1. Similarly, for the other player, who can only 
afford credible counter objections with a low risk of breakdown.  
Since wi′(1)>0, i=1, 2, every candidate Nash outcome is interior, i.e., x1* (0, 1). This 
implies that each player can successfully counter object against objections in which 
his opponent claims (almost) the entire cake, because f(0; x1*), f(1; x1*)>0. Thus, only 
modest objections matter. 
In GK94 the SH theorem is applied in order to provide sufficient conditions for 
existence of a Nash outcome. Fig. 1 illustrates the application of the SH theorem in 
the (x1, p)-space for  
 
and for  
 
. The condition f(x1; x1*)≥0 requires that 
 
lies above 
 
Application of the SH theorem imposes that 
 
is convex and 
 
is concave. The separating hyperplane is the line given by 
 
through the point (x1, p)=(x1*, 1). Clearly, this line separates the two curves, which 
suffices to obtain f(x1; x1*)≥0. However, Fig. 2, which is based on 
 
illustrates a case in which f(x1; x1*)≥0 while 
 
convex.  
 
 Full-size image (4K) 
 Fig. 1. For β1=β2=1 in Example 1 the SH theorem applies. 
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Fig. 2. For β1=β2=−  
 
in Example 1 the SH theorem does not apply.  
 
Application of the SH theorem implies f is convex. A less restrictive sufficient 
condition for f(x1; x1*)≥0 requires that f(x1; x1*) is non-increasing on [0, x1*) and non-
decreasing on (x1*, 1], which includes the case f convex. In order to do so we define 
the boldness b1(x1) of player 1 as 
 
and the boldness b2(x1) of player 2 as 
 
The boldness bi(x1), i=1, 2, can be regarded as a measure of the willingness to 
accept the risk wi−1(.) of disagreement in return for an improvement of the outcome of 
the magnitude |x1−x1*|. This definition extends the definition of marginal boldness in 
GK94, where the latter is defined as bi(x1*), i=1, 2. 
Proposition 4. A sufficient condition for x* X to be a Nash outcome is 
  
 
The interpretation of these conditions is as follows. Suppose x1<x1*. Then 
 
relates player 2's boldness to the size of the intended gain of the objection x1 over 
x1*. The sufficient condition states (in terms of first derivatives) that player 2 should 
not object if player 1 is willing to counterobject. The sufficient condition only imposes 
conditions on first derivatives and not on second derivatives.  
The following example illustrates that the sufficient conditions in GK94 are more 
restrictive than the conditions in proposition 4. 
Example 1. Consider the disappointment averse utility function 
 
and i=1,2, as axiomatized in Gul (1991). We will show that 
 
is the unique Nash outcome for every pair (β1, β2). First, application of Proposition 3 
yields that 
 
is the unique maximizer of  
 
. Second, we have to verify whether f(x1; x1*)≥0. Suppose x1>x1*. Then 
 can be rewritten as 
 
A similar quadratic expression follows for x1<x1*. Hence, x1* is the Nash outcome for 
all β1, β2>−1.  
The sufficient conditions in GK94 imply wi(p), i=1, 2, is convex and log-concave, i.e., 
βi [0,1]. Thus, for β1, β2 (−1, 0), this example shows that a unique Nash outcome 
exists for concave wi. For β1, β2 (1, ∞) this example shows a unique Nash outcome 
exists for convex wi that are not log-concave. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our results imply the following two-step procedure to calculate Nash outcomes for 
specific functional forms. First, compute all candidates for the Nash outcome by 
finding the stationary points of Proposition 3. Second, verify for each candidate Nash 
outcome whether the condition in either Proposition 1 or Proposition 4 is met. This 
latter step is equivalent to evaluating whether a particular function is non-negative. In 
case of a numerical representation one can resort to computer assistance in verifying 
these conditions. 
The sufficient conditions in GK94 are conditions imposed upon each player's DW 
utility function separately. The condition in Proposition 4 restricts the function f and, 
therefore, this is a condition upon both player's DW utility functions simultaneously. 
Therefore, the latter approach is less demanding. Nevertheless, the condition in 
Proposition 4 is still restrictive, because cases in which the function f has local 
minima x1 other than x1* as well as cases with interior local maxima x1 (0, 1) are 
excluded. 
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1This proof only requires ui, i=1, 2, and wi strictly increasing. 
 
